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A VERY NEW LAWYER'S FIRST CASE:
BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION
John J. Cound*
They asked the FBI three times to find me that mid-August
weekend in 1953. They couldn't do it. Maybe I should have
held up a bank or two. They turned the job over to the Harvard
Law School grapevine, and within two hours I had a telegram
from my fiancee telling me to call a Philip Elman.
I was a year out of law school and had just completed a
wonderful clerkship in New York with Learned Hand. I was on
vacation, a job with the Department of Justice to begin September 15. When I called Elman, he said that Justice was forming a
group to brief the reargument in the School Segregation Cases.
Could I come to work immediately? I reported on Monday and
began my first case.
The Segregation Cases were five lawsuits involving segregated schools in Delaware, Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia,
and the District of Columbia. The thrust of plaintiffs' claims
was no longer for equal schools- for better schools- but for the
same schools, for a decision that law-enforced segregation of
primary and secondary public schools violated the Constitution
of the United States. The principle had been established for
graduate and professional schools. The NAACP, in a carefully
planned campaign, was now extending its challenge to the lower
grades. The focus of the case was aided by a finding in the Kansas district court that the black and white schools of Topeka
were physically, and in all other respects, equal. In the other
four areas black schools were clearly unequal; in D.C., South
Carolina, and Virginia, federal courts had given the states time
to build new schools. Interestingly, it was only the state courts
of Delaware that, while finding that U.S. Supreme Court precedent allowed separate but equal treatment, nevertheless ordered
the immediate admission of black children to white schools,
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. This was a talk given to Friends of
the University of Minnesota Library, February 5, 1998.
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pending efforts to bring the black schools up to equality. The
1
right of the children, the Delaware court said, was personal.
The five cases had been argued in December of 1952, but in
June 1953 reargument was ordered, with directions "to discuss
particularly five questions."
The first two questions dealt with the history of the Fourteenth Amendment. Was there an intention or understanding of
Congress, or of the state legislatures which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, with respect to segregation in the public
schools?
The last two questions, perhaps critical to the Court's eventual conclusion, asked whether the Court, if it found a constitutional violation, might allow a gradual adjustment.
The third question asked whether, if the legislative history
provided no answer, it was "within the judicial power, in construing the Amendment, to abolish segregation in public
schools"?
It was this third question I was asked to brief. The "team"
consisted of Philip Elman, a member of the Solicitor General's
office, who had handled most of the Government's civil rights
work, and four other lawyers, two from Alien Property, one
from Antitrust and one from Tax. They were all experienced
lawyers. Only I was brand-new. Within the Department overall
responsibility for the project lay with the Assistant Attorney
General for the Office of Legal Counsel, Lee Rankin, an excellent Nebraska lawyer with no experience in constitutional law.
Eisenhower had not yet named a Solicitor General. One consequence of that vacancy provided me with the biggest office I will
ever have. All the other team members were established lawyers in the Department; they had offices. I was given the S.G.'s
office, about the size of a basketball court with its own bath. I
felt like a beetle in the Temple of Karnak. I found a tiny room
over the secretary's office, which Justice Reed had put in for
himself when he was S.G. There I prepared the Government's
answer to Question 3.
Writing a vigorous argument that it was indeed "within the
judicial power, in construing the Amendment, to abolish segregation in the public schools" I found myself reflecting that this
was a slant quite different from the lessons I had learned during
the preceding year from America's stoutest exponent of judicial
1.

Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137 (1952).
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restraint. I was still answering some questions from the Judge
about a complex case on which I had worked. In a letter I commented that my present task entailed a view of judicial power
quite different from the one he had so recently imparted to me.
I received a quick reply, in which he said, "I am sorry if anything
I have said to you is troubling you in your new work." I assumed he was simply telling me to do my job-Hand was a charter member of Holmes's Society of Jobbists and regarded
craftsmanlike performance as man's closest approach to meaning. But I have always wondered whether he was also telling me
that he would have had little philosophical problem with this
one.
I had been picked for the team because I had a strong law
school record, and, most important, I was available. I was certainly not selected because of any track record on the issue. My
views on segregation were hardly militant. Until law school, I
had never attended an integrated school. Two years in Louisiana, one year in Virginia, and nine years in the District of Columbia schools. Four years at all-white George Washington
University. Harvard Law School had a few African-American
students, but I think there were none in my class of 1952. I
hadn't thought much about the question until Law School. I had
frequently in the previous year discussed the issue with Gus
Hand's law clerk, a good friend from law school. I think Harry
Thayer descended from Massachusetts abolitionists, and he had
no doubts about the proper answer. Ironically, after the clerkships my next meeting with Harry was at the Supreme Court
during the December oral arguments. He had gone with Davis,
Polk in New York, and his first assignment-with which he was
distinctly not pleased- was to the South Carolina brief.
I favored integration as a policy, although I was undecided
on the constitutional question. I had three reasons for my
judgment on policy. First, I could not see any good reason for
segregation. Why shouldn't blacks and whites go to school together? Second, it seemed economically dumb. As a Virginia
taxpayer, I thought running one school system was hard enough.
Why two? Third, separate-but-equal was a myth; it had never
existed anywhere with which I was familiar. In Washington,
D.C. and Arlington, Virginia, the systems were not even close.
The 1951 dissenting opinion of Henry Edgerton in the D.C. Circuit case of Carr v Cominl demonstrates that there had been
2.

182 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
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not the slightest attempt to maintain equal schools. (There had
been a controversy among the black civil rights lawyers about
Carr, those who wanted segregation banned outright were opposed to litigating a case which so clearly invited an order to
equalize.) Maybe segregation was not per se unconstitutional,
but I was authoritarian enough in my legal attitudes that I could
not accept ignoring the separate-only-if-equal mandate. A view
that the Southern states had forfeited any claim to run separate
schools made my conversion to the constitutional position easy.
I have briefed more difficult issues in less important cases.
Ironically the precedent most difficult to distinguish was an 1899
opinion by Justice Harlan,3 who had dissented from the separate-and equal doctrine in Plessy and insisted that the Constitution is color-blind. The Court permitted the operation of a
white high school when no similar school for blacks was provided. Standing by itself, the case clearly does not sit easily with
Brown. But the Supreme Court had in enough subsequent cases
found an obligation of at-least-equality to render the 1899 decision a sport. The argument made in the early '50s by the Southem states that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to
education had clearly been rejected decades before.
The briefing of Question Three took about three weeks.
Just about the time it was finished, we learned of the sudden
death of Chief Justice Fred Vinson. Much has been written
about the significance of this event to the eventual outcome.
Justice Frankfurter is frequently quoted as saying that "This is
the first solid piece of evidence I've ever had that there really is
a God." At the time no one expressed such a sentiment to me.
Perhaps that shows how low on the totem pole I was. Vinson is
said to have been opposed to overruling Plessy: A sure vote
against. I think two comments on Vinson are appropriate: Vinson marshaled the unanimous Courts for the decisions in
McLaurin 4 and Sweatt5 -the Oklahoma and Texas law school
cases-and in Shelley v. Kraemer, 6 which many scholars in the
'50s regarded as the toughest of them all. Second, Earl Warren
was certainly a positive accession.
I was then assigned to join the others who were researching
the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, and spent
about eight weeks in the Library of Congress. The Congres3.
4.
5.

6.

Cumming v. Board of Education,115 U.S. 528 (1899).
McLaurin v. Oklahomtl State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
334 u.s. 1 (1948).
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sional history had been finished, but we now engaged in a stateby-state examination. We looked at the governors' addresses,
the legislative journals, and the few committee reports. We
went page by page through newspapers covering the entire legislative session. We looked into memoirs and current histories.
It was fascinating, but it was not very revealing on our questions.
You will note that I did not mention legislative debates. In 1866
only two states reported debates: Pennsylvania in full, Indiana in
digest. (This was incidentally still the case in 1953.) It is frequently said that there is nothing in the records about schools
and segregation (often attributed to the fact that many states
had no public education for anybody at the time). But there is a
single mention in each of the two states for whom we have a record of debates. In Pennsylvania the mention was by a supporter of the Amendment. In Indiana it was an opponent who
threatened, "Pass this amendment, and your children will go to
school with black children."
Our conclusion was "in sum, while the legislative history
does not conclusively establish that the Congress which proposed the Fourteenth Amendment specifically understood that
it would abolish racial segregation in the public schools, there is
ample evidence that it did understand that the Amendment established the broad constitutional principle of full and complete
equality of all persons under the law, and that it forbade all legal
distinctions based on race and color."
Incidentally, one thing which research showed was that
there was a time in this country when party loyalty meant something. In all the non-secessionist states, no Republican legislator
voted against ratification; only one Democrat voted in favor. As
a Republican in 1953, I was rather proud of that.
We were informed by Elman the day the brief went to the
Court that Rankin had told him that Attorney General Brownell
had taken the brief to the White House and that the President
had approved.
I now began my regular assignment in the Appellate Section of the Civil Division. But when the oral arguments took
place I was privileged to sit with counsel. Indeed I was lucky
enough to sit immediately behind Thurgood Marshall and Jack
Greenberg. When you have been immersed for a dozen weeks
on a legal matter, listening to about fifteen hours of argument is
interesting, but not very exciting. It is unlikely that anything
new or startling will occur. There was one stir. Late on the sec-
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ond afternoon, the case from the District of Columbia was begun. The question quickly arose whether the Corporation
Counsel continued to represent the School Board. Congress had
never ordered segregation in the D.C. schools; it had simply
made separate appropriations for what were designated Division
One (white) and Division Two (black) schools. Less than two
weeks before the arguments the School Board made noises
about itself integrating the D.C. schools. There were questions
from the Court, but nothing came of it. I thought the Court was
not prepared to let the strongest case for integration -the nation's capital-pass out of its reach. My chief memory of the
episode came on the third morning, when John W. Davis came
over to Thurgood Marshall and smilingly showed him a telegram
"from Governor Byrnes saying that I do represent the state of
South Carolina."
The arguments on the whole were solid. A few impressions
remain. The very courtly Attorney General of Delaware, Hollywood's image of a Supreme Court advocate. Thurgood Marshall's forceful dignity. John W. Davis, over 80, in the last of a
hundred and forty arguments he made before the Court, was not
as impressive. The few questions addressed to him by the Justices seemed to reflect a sense that his responses would not be
too helpful. (I was told by my later boss in the Department that
during the arguments in the Steel Seizure Cases two years before, virtually no questions were addressed to Davis arguing for
the steel companies, while a young lawyer making the same arguments for the Locomotive Engineers was subjected to what
the boss described as "the most merciless questioning I have
ever heard in the Court."). My favorite of the lawyers was
James Nabrit representing the black students in the District of
Columbia case. He was a master of the "I'm only a simple country lawyer" approach, although he had an extensive urban practice. He phrased many of his arguments as humble suggestions,
while, as a colleague phrased it, "firing greased curveballs past
the court." I was happy to read Richard Kluger conclude in his
book Simple Justice, that Nabrit had "provided the Negro side
with its most memorable moment of oratory."7 Nabrit died in
December 1997; I thought the press might have been more attentive to his passing.
One other part of the argument is unforgettable. During an
afternoon when the tremendous significance of the occasion be7.

Richard Kluger, Simple Justice 676 (Knopf, 1975).
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gan to be challenged by the dim light and warm air of the courtroom, I was glad to see that mine was not the only attention that
needed reinforcement. Attorney General Lindsay Almond of
Virginia was speaking, and was using the tidewater pronunciation of "nigra." Thurgood Marshall and Jack Greenberg sat in
the chairs immediately in front of me, carefully paying attention- to see if Almond slipped into a more opprobrious word. I
remember Marshall whispering, "There he almost said it,"
"That's closer," and finally "There, he did it!"
I doubt the oral arguments affected any vote. They rarely
do in the most important cases. But it was hard to observe the
quality, the integrity, and the dedication of the NAACP lawyers
without feeling that a system that separated them from the rest
of us was terribly wrong. That, I think, was the most important
contribution of the argument sessions.
The Government's brief argued that if the Court struck
down segregation it could order a gradual implementation. The
Government had proposed this in 1952 as well. Philip Elman in
an oral archive 8 asserts that this was a necessary concession if
some Justices were to be persuaded; it was, he thought, the key
to a unanimous opinion. The NAACP argued that a remedy
must issue "forthwith." When the Court in May 1954 came
down with its opinion declaring school segregation unconstitutional, it ordered another reargument on the remedy. I was
vaguely troubled at the time at the delay. The District of Columbia board immediately announced integration for the Fall of
1954. I am glad that George Washington University, though a
private institution, made the same decision. But it seemed that
the Southern states simply took the time to dig deeper. I did not
play any part in the work on the new brief. When the Court in
May 1955 announced that integration should proceed "with all
deliberate speed," I told a colleague that I was reminded of the
story of the young lady who told her boyfriend, "I will give you
just one-half hour to take your hand off my knee."
The Government's position, in my view, was justified only if
it was necessary to a majority. I have always believed that unanimity was an overrated concern. From McCulloch v. Maryland
to Roe v. Wade, many of the Court's most important decisions
have been split. Many unanimous decisions have stirred significant opposition. It is not to be expected, I believe, that experi8. P. Elman and N. Silber, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and
Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-60: An Oral History, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 817 (1987).
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enced and highly intelligent men and women will easily reach
unanimity on propositions more controversial than a geometry
theorem. The Court again was unanimous in ordering integration of Little Rock Central High School in 1957; indeed in an
unusual gesture the opinion was issued in the name of each justice. It took the United States Army to enforce that one. Incidentally I believe that the President's action and the soldier's
bayonets were accepted by the nation because it was the law and
the law must be obeyed. I wonder whether that argument would
carry so well today?
I make no pretense to having played a significant part in
this great case. I can look at the brief and see that I wrote a very
important section of it; my contribution to the historical appendix is a substantial part of the best legislative history of the
Fourteenth Amendment ever compiled. But I know that if I had
not been there the brief and the history would have looked
much the same, and the result of the case would certainly not
have changed. I was no part of strategic or tactical choices, nor
the origin of any brilliant insight. I did a lawyer's job; I am glad
we won, and I am proud to have been there. Agincourt would
have been won had any single English archer been abed upon St.
Crispian's day, but Henry V told the happy few that each would
be remembered. When I sat in the court on that second afternoon in the subdued December light and was simultaneously
bored and thrilled, there crossed my mind the motto of my high
school-the now-most-integrated high school in the city of
Washington. The motto, from Virgil: Haec 0/im Meminisse Juvabit. In times to come it may please us to remember this. It
pleases me to remember those days.

